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Abstract 
 
We study the dispersion of month-end valuations placed on identical corporate 
bonds by different mutual funds.  Such dispersion is related to bond-specific 
characteristics associated with liquidity and market volatility. TRACE may have 
contributed to the general decline in dispersion over our sample period, though other 
factors most likely played roles.  Further tests reveal marking patterns to be consistent 
with returns smoothing behavior by managers.  Funds with ambiguous marking policies 
and those holding “hard-to-mark” bonds appear more prone to smooth reported returns.  
From a regulatory perspective, we see little downside to requiring funds to explicitly state 
their marking standards.  
   1
1.  Introduction  
  How hard is it to mark illiquid securities for position valuation purposes?  The 
issue of marking accuracy by banks, hedge funds, and mutual funds became a focal point 
for company boards, regulators and the financial press during the credit crisis that began 
in August 2007. The SEC is actively examining how institutional investors “value their 
hard-to-value” securities.
1 Indeed, two investment advisers recently settled charges of 
negligent mispricing of certain mortgage-backed bonds and high-yield municipal bonds 
in their respective mutual funds in ways that caused artificially high prices for their 
funds’ shares.
2  This paper offers direct insights into important aspects of pricing 
securities for position valuation purposes by examining the dispersion of month-end 
valuations simultaneously placed on identical US corporate bonds by an important set of 
traders, the managers of US bond mutual funds. 
 We first examine the cross-fund pricing dispersion of individual bonds.  Marking 
corporate bonds is hard.  After controlling for differences related to choice of marking 
standards, we show that pricing dispersion is related to bond-specific characteristics 
typically associated with market liquidity.  Specifically, cross-fund pricing dispersion is 
higher for lower credit quality bonds, longer maturity bonds, and smaller-sized issues.  
Price dispersion for individual bonds also increases during periods when bond market 
return volatility is high. 
We next study the time series of bond price dispersion.  Bond price dispersion 
declined during our sample period.  Of course, a decline in price dispersion over the 
entire sample period would be consistent with a number of explanations. Interestingly, 
during this same time period, Financial Industry Regulatory Authority’s (FINRA) Trade 
Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE) for collecting and disseminating corporate 
bond transaction details expanded.  There is some evidence that the declines in price 
dispersion were faster during the six months after the TRACE expansions.  However, the 
declines were gradual and there is no evidence that the directly affected bonds dropped 
more rapidly.  
                                                 
1 As reported in Volz (2009) and Pulliam, Smith and Siconolfi (2007).  
2 See the SEC’s actions versus Evergreen Investment Management Company, LLC and Evergreen Investment Services, 
Inc. (http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2009/34-60059.pdf) and Heartland Advisors, Inc. 
 (http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2008/33-8884.pdf).     2
Finally, we investigate whether bond mutual funds strategically mark bonds to 
smooth reported returns.  Returns smoothing involves marking positions such that the net 
asset value (NAV) is set above or below the true value of fund shares, resulting in wealth 
transfers across existing, new and redeeming fund investors. Moreover, returns 
smoothing distorts a fund’s risk-return profile, such as its Sharpe ratio, perhaps leading 
investors to make sub-optimal allocation decisions. 
Like their hedge fund brethren, mutual fund managers compete with each other to 
attract new fund inflows on the basis of risk-adjusted performance statistics.  Thus, all 
mutual fund managers have an incentive to smooth returns. However, while the motive to 
smooth returns exists, the means and opportunity for mutual fund managers to engage in 
discretionary returns management may be significantly more limited than those of 
unregulated hedge fund managers. One important constraint is SEC oversight of mutual 
funds regarding marking policies, especially with respect to adherence to each fund’s 
statements to investors about how it will mark securities.  While the majority of funds 
explicitly describe their security marking practices in their prospectuses (such as the use 
of bid prices or the midpoint of bid and ask price indications contributed by professional 
bond pricing services), some funds provide only ambiguous statements (such as a 
practice of marking debt securities at “fair value”). Of course, managers of funds 
concentrating on US Treasury bond investments have little scope to shade their marks. 
However, corporate bond fund managers may have substantial room to adjust prices of 
their illiquid, thinly traded securities upward or downward to smooth returns.   
We present two sets of tests of returns smoothing behavior. Our first tests focus 
on the individual bond marks. The results reveal that the probability of observing a “high 
mark” is larger when a fund reports a return that underperforms the index. The results 
also show that the probability of observing a “low mark” is larger when a fund reports a 
return that outperforms the index.  These patterns in the individual bond marks are 
consistent with returns smoothing. 
Our second tests of returns smoothing behavior focus directly on the fund returns 
themselves. Our study is the first to provide returns smoothing evidence using direct 
holdings-based estimates of delegated portfolio managers’ true economic returns. To 
date, researchers have focused on hedge fund reported returns.  Lacking access to   3
individual hedge fund holdings, Getmansky, Lo and Makarov (2004) rely heavily on 
econometric techniques to make indirect inferences about the relationship between 
reported and true economic returns of hedge funds. They find significant serial 
correlation in hedge fund returns and suggest that their findings may be driven either by 
problems in valuing illiquid assets or by discretionary returns management.  Empirically 
distinguishing between the illiquidity and discretionary returns management explanations 
using only reported returns data may be difficult.  Bollen and Pool (2008, 2009) make 
inferences using reported returns and find evidence consistent with hedge funds actively 
delaying or avoiding the reporting of small losses.  Adding to the literature on returns 
management by delegated portfolio managers, our paper uses actual portfolio holdings 
data and develops direct tests to distinguish between the illiquidity and return smoothing 
explanations. 
We develop a holdings-based “custom benchmark” to study fund performance 
using common bond marks that allows for a direct test of returns smoothing behavior. 
Our estimates for a variant of Getmansky, Lo and Makarov’s (2004) model imply that the 
idiosyncratic part of a fund’s reported return moves in the opposite direction of the 
contemporaneous true economic return. This is consistent with returns smoothing. The 
quantitative importance of such smoothing is larger for funds that we classify as 
“ambiguous” markers. In addition, the quantitative impact of such smoothing is larger for 
funds holding portfolios of “hard-to-mark” bonds. Such funds have greater leeway in 
marking bonds up or down because the wider range of marks by other funds makes it 
easier to justify one’s own marking choice as reasonable. Taken altogether, these results 
suggest that managers of funds that lack an explicitly stated marking policy (i.e., have the 
“means”) and hold portfolios of bonds that have the widest marking uncertainty (i.e., 
have the “opportunity”) are most prone to smoothing reported fund returns.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 provides a review 
of the related literature and discusses some specific issues related to valuing the 
individual holdings of bond funds.  Section 3 discusses our data and summary statistics 
on bond fund holdings.  Section 4 discusses the impact of bid-price versus mid-price 
bond marking standards.  Section 5 presents our main empirical findings on cross-fund 
individual bond price dispersion, fund-by-fund portfolio marking practices and the   4
impact of TRACE on bond valuation precision.  Section 6 investigates the relationship 
between marking patterns of certain funds and possible returns smoothing behavior.   
Section 7 concludes.   
 
2.  The setting 
Some students of equity markets and equity mutual funds may already be puzzled 
with our focus on the dispersion of month-end prices of identical bonds.  Unlike equities, 
the overwhelming majority of bond trading takes place in over-the-counter dealer 
markets instead of on centralized exchanges.  Thus, bond mutual funds do not share 
common access to a single exchange-determined closing price for each individual bond 
issue.
3  For some issues, this lack of an exchange-determined closing price is not an 
important impediment to valuing a fund’s holding.  For example, trading in each of the 
most recently auctioned (on-the-run) US Treasury securities is highly liquid and 
transparent.  Dealer-to-dealer and dealer-to-customer electronic trading platforms and the 
ubiquitous Bloomberg terminal offer continuous pictures of bid and asked prices for these 
securities.  In stark contrast, most high-yield corporate bond issues trade infrequently in 
thin, illiquid markets.  Indeed, many individual corporate bond issues are held mainly as 
long-term investments in insurance company portfolios and trade rarely after an initial 
distribution period.  So a mutual fund may need to produce daily valuations for some 
specific issues that have not traded for days or even weeks.   
 
2.1.  Related literature 
Our research touches on themes that have stimulated a number of recent studies in 
the academic literature including mutual fund valuation fairness, the relationship between 
market transparency and pricing efficiency, and the specific impacts of TRACE on the 
US corporate bond market.  Problems associated with fairly setting daily mutual fund 
NAVs have been addressed in the academic literature, especially with regard to the 
activities of market-timing traders.  Market-timing activity has been particularly severe 
for funds that naturally hold illiquid securities – e.g., international equity funds, small-
                                                 
3 Valuing equities based upon exchange-determined closing prices can also be problematic since such prices for many 
thinly-traded stocks may be stale. See the fair value discussion below.   5
capitalization equity funds and high-yield corporate bond funds.  Previous studies find 
evidence of large fund trading flows and large excess returns to stale price-oriented 
mutual fund trading strategies.
4  These results have focused attention on the need to 
accurately value securities positions for mutual fund NAV calculations.  Our focus on the 
cross-fund dispersion of mutual fund valuations on a given security offers direct 
observations and insights into NAV calculation problems at the individual security level.   
The literature has also investigated the relationship between market transparency 
and pricing efficiency and, as relates to corporate bonds, the specific impacts of TRACE 
on trading costs in the US corporate bond market.  This literature distinguishes between 
pre-trade transparency (e.g., dissemination of bid and ask quotations, market depth, etc.) 
and post-trade transparency (e.g., timely public reporting of price and quantity data from 
actual trades).  In this light, the impact of TRACE’s introduction of post-trade price 
transparency in the secondary corporate bond market is of particular interest.  Indeed, 
TRACE has already attracted attention in the market microstructure transactions costs 
literature.  Bessembinder, Maxwell and Venkataraman (2006) estimate that TRACE 
eligibility reduces trade execution costs by one-half, and that a spillover liquidity effect 
results in a one-fifth cost reduction even for non-eligible bonds.
5  Edwards, Harris and 
Piwowar (2007) show that corporate bond transaction costs, measured as a function of 
trade size, are lower for bonds with transparent trade prices and that such costs drop when 
TRACE starts to publicly disseminate bond prices.  Goldstein, Hotchkiss and Sirri (2007) 
investigate the last-sale trade reporting impact on BBB-rated corporate bond market 
liquidity.  They find that the effect of post-trade transparency varies with trade size and 
has a neutral or positive effect on market liquidity.  Except for the case of the most 
infrequently traded issues, bid-ask spreads on bonds whose prices become transparent 
decline by more than that of a control group. Our investigation of TRACE impacts on 
price dispersion relates most directly to Bessembinder, Maxwell and Venkataraman’s 
(2006) framework since they motivate a presumed salutary impact of TRACE on 
                                                 
4 See, for example, Bhargava, Bose and Dubofsky (1998), Boudoukh, Richardson, Subrahmanyam and Whitelaw 
(2002), Chalmers, Edelen and Kadlec (2001), Goetzmann, Ivkovic and Rouwenhorst (2001), Green and Hodges (2002) 
and Zitzewitz (2003) 
5 This finding is consistent with a related liquidity externality found for Tel Aviv Stock Exchange securities by 
Amihud, Mendelson and Lauterbach (1997) since improved price discovery for one security improves price discovery 
for other related securities.   6
transactions costs by focusing on the role of improved precision in estimating corporate 
bond value.
6   
 
2.2.  Pricing bond holdings for mutual fund NAV purposes 
Under the Investment Company Act of 1940, the definition of “value” for mutual 
fund securities holdings is construed in one of two ways.  Securities for which “readily 
available” market quotations exist must be valued at market levels.  All other securities 
must be priced at “fair value” as determined in good faith according to processes 
approved by the fund’s board of directors.  Marking a particular security at a fair value 
requires a determination of what an arm's-length buyer, under the circumstances, would 
currently pay for that security. SEC Accounting Series Release Nos. 113 and 118 
recognize that no single standard exists for determining fair value.  By the SEC’s 
interpretation, a board acts in good faith when its fair value determination is the result of 
a sincere and honest assessment of the amount that the fund might reasonably expect to 
receive for a security upon its current sale, based upon all of the appropriate factors that 
are available to the fund.  Fund directors must "satisfy themselves that all appropriate 
factors relevant to the value of securities for which market quotations are not readily 
available have been considered” and “determine the method of arriving at the fair value 
of each such security."  
As a practical matter, a mutual fund could comply with the Investment Company 
Act’s mandate to mark bond positions using “readily available” market quotations by 
relying on a single pricing service or multiple securities pricing services and/or securities 
dealers for the fund’s holdings.
7  Securities pricing services produce and offer marks 
derived from analysis of various sources.  Pricing services are for-profit firms that 
provide prices and pricing-related data to financial institutions like mutual funds for a fee.  
Pricing services compete for business along dimensions of pricing quality, security 
coverage and data transmission reliability.
8  These data cover both listed market price 
                                                 
6 Bessembinder, Maxwell and Venkataraman (2006) analyze the relationship between market transparency and price 
efficiency in the context of a world in which transactions costs increase with the variance of valuation errors.  They 
offer two channels for such a relationship: greater valuation errors (1) may increase the inventory risks of market-
making and (2) may increase the likelihood that dealers can extract rents from less-well-informed counterparties. 
7 For more institutional details on bond pricing issues please see Appendix A. 
8 Current and past providers of evaluated pricing services over our sample period include Interactive Data Corporation, 
Standard & Poor's Security Evaluations, Thomson Reuters DataScope Evaluated Pricing Service, JPMorgan’s   7
data for exchange-traded securities and “evaluated” price data for over-the-counter 
market securities.  The price data for the exchange-listed securities are collected from the 
exchanges.  An “evaluated” price for an over-the-counter market security is produced 
from firm-specific methodologies that combine information from a number of sources as 
well as professional judgment.  A price needs to be produced each day even if the 
security in question did not trade that same day.  
The fund could adhere to mechanical rules to use a predetermined single source or 
combine information from a number of sources, or else sometimes utilize discretion in 
adjustments to the individual security marks.  Some funds outsource the actual fund 
accounting function to firms specializing in that function, while other funds, especially 
those organized within a large fund family, perform the fund accounting function in-
house.  Thus, mutual funds have substantial discretion in the marking of bonds.   
Moreover, such discretion may be useful when legitimate differences exist among 
competing external pricing sources for particular securities.  Conversations with industry 
professionals revealed that individual traders, analysts and portfolio managers responsible 
for specific security positions routinely investigate and sometimes challenge the standard 
pricing source for any particular security when that default price feed result appears 
unreasonable.  Such challenges involve questioning the pricing service responsible and 
obtaining “market color” on the security from a number of dealers.  A portfolio manager 
identified with a decision to buy a particular security position has an incentive to 
investigate adverse marks on that security in order both to understand price moves as well 
as to protect his/her reputation within the firm.  Such an investigation may result in a 
fund’s decision to override the default price feed result.   
 
3.  Data and mutual fund corporate bond ownership statistics 
3.1.  Data 
We use five databases in our study:  (1) the Morningstar mutual fund holdings 
database, (2) the CRSP Survivor-Bias Free US Mutual Fund Database, (3) the Mergent 
                                                                                                                                                 
PricingDirect, Markit, SIX Telekurs, SVC Corp. and FRI Corp. (In addition, Bloomberg delivers pricing information 
aggregated from various sources.)  Some providers focus on specific asset classes.  Nelson (2007) provides an 
overview of the pricing service industry.   8
Fixed Income Securities Database (FISD), (4) the TRACE database, and (5) Bloomberg 
corporate bond price data.  
From Morningstar, we obtained mutual fund holdings data from January 1995 to 
December 2006 for 2,268 funds classified as fixed income funds.  For each fund and date, 
the Morningstar mutual fund holdings database reports the CUSIP identifier of each 
security held and both the market and par values of each particular security holding.  
Based on the available Morningstar investment categories, each fund falls into one of 
four broad groups: Corporate Bond Funds, Government Bond Funds, Municipal Bond 
Funds, and Foreign Bond Funds.  The database includes both surviving and dead funds 
and reports many additional statistics for each period in which a fund had a holdings 
report.  Some of these fund statistics include an average maturity score, average credit 
quality, average duration, and several additional portfolio composition variables such as 
percentage invested in government bonds, corporate bonds, bonds of a particular credit 
rating (e.g., AAA or BBB), etc.  Although funds were mandated to publicly report 
holdings only semiannually until 2004 and quarterly thereafter, some funds voluntarily 
reported holdings to Morningstar monthly.   
We obtained monthly mutual fund returns from the CRSP Survivor-Bias Free 
Mutual Fund Database. We merged the Morningstar and CRSP databases using 
algorithms based on matching fund tickers and fund names.  Over the 2003-2006 period 
when both databases reported bond holdings, our matching algorithm was supplemented 
with matches for holding positions.  Out of the 2,268 funds in Morningstar we were able 
to find a match for 2,123 funds from the CRSP Database.
9   
From FISD, we obtained the credit rating, coupon rate, maturity date and issue 
size for a given bond at a particular point in time.  We merged FISD with Morningstar 
holdings using bond CUSIPs.  
From the TRACE database, we obtained trade-related information for each 
corporate bond such as the date and time of trade.  FINRA, which is responsible for 
maintaining the TRACE database, provided us with additional data detailing the dates 
when corporate bonds became eligible for dissemination in the TRACE system. 
                                                 
9 CRSP mutual fund return data is reported at the fund share class level and not at the portfolio level.  We computed a 
single portfolio return each month by averaging the returns of all share classes belonging to a common portfolio after 
weighting the returns of each share class by the assets of each share class.   9
Finally, from Bloomberg, we downloaded historical end-of-month bid and ask 
prices for each corporate bond.  The Bloomberg and TRACE data were linked with the 
FISD data using bond CUSIPs.   
 
3.2.  Mutual fund ownership profiles of corporate bonds 
We use two measures to quantify and assess bond mutual fund ownership 
characteristics for different types of bonds.  This first measure, Own Ratio, is calculated 
for each bond in a given year as the percentage of the issue size held by all 2,268 bond 
mutual funds.  The second measure, Own Number, is calculated for each bond in a given 
year as the number of funds holding that bond.  As in Falkenstein (1996), both of these 
measures are calculated every year and use the latest holdings report in a given year for a 
given mutual fund.  The average and median values reported in Table 1 are taken across 
71,758 year-bond observations corresponding to a set of 15,291 non-convertible 
corporate bonds. 
 
<Insert Table 1 about here> 
 
Panel A of Table 1 reports ownership statistics for all bonds.  Panel B reports 
mean and median values for the ownership statistics by credit rating group.  Each credit 
rating group suppresses the half-step distinctions (e.g., BBB-, BBB, and BBB+ bonds are 
all categorized as BBB).  Panel C reports statistics categorized by the size of the issue.  
Each year, bonds are ranked on issue size and placed into deciles: the highest-issue-size 
bonds are placed in Decile 1 and lowest-issue-size bonds are placed in Decile 10.   
Ownership statistics categorized into four groups defined by the time to maturity are 
reported in Panel D.  
The results in Table 1 reveal that the bond mutual fund ownership of corporate 
bonds tends to be relatively more concentrated in the intermediate maturity and high-
yield sectors.  For example, the median Own Ratio for high-yield bonds is more than four 
times the corresponding value for investment grade bonds. Perhaps more striking, the 
median Own Ratio for B-rated bonds is almost ten times the corresponding value for 
AAA-rated bonds.  Across the maturity spectrum, mutual funds own substantially higher   10
fractions of outstanding issues in the intermediate 5-to-10-year sector than they do in 
other maturity sectors. There does not appear to be any issue size-related tendency 
regarding mutual fund participation as measured by the Own Ratio.  However, the results 
for Own Number measure clearly reveal that the largest issues are the most widely held. 
The Own Number results for our sample of mutual funds suggest that large-sized, 5-to-
10-year maturity high-yield bonds are the most widely held corporate issues.   
 
4.  “Mid” versus “bid” bond pricing 
4.1.  Institutional details 
Systematic pricing practices employed by mutual funds can affect the measured 
bond-pricing dispersion among mutual funds. SEC Accounting Series Release No. 118 
provides guidance on how investment companies should value over-the-counter securities 
like corporate bonds to be in compliance with the Investment Act of 1940: 
 
“Because of the availability of multiple sources, a company frequently has a 
greater number of options open to it in valuing securities traded in the over-the-
counter market than it does in valuing listed securities.  A company may adopt a 
policy of using a mean of the bid prices, or of the bid and asked prices, or of the 
prices of a representative selection of broker-dealers quoting on a particular 
security; or it may use a valuation within the range of bid and asked prices 
considered best to represent value in the circumstances.  Any of these policies is 
acceptable if consistently applied.  Normally, the use of asked prices alone is not 
acceptable.” 
 
SEC guidance requires funds to mark bond values at a price equal to or greater than bid 
prices and less than ask prices.  Beyond this limitation, however, funds are given 
considerable discretion in the method they choose to mark bond values.  The marking 
method chosen can produce substantial pricing differences of the same security across 
funds in markets like high-yield corporate bonds where bid-ask spreads can be relatively 
wide. 
<Insert Table 2 about here> 
 
4.2.  Categorizing funds by marking standard   11
We checked the SEC marking guidelines against how funds reported their bond 
marking practices in their prospectuses.  Some funds explicitly described a practice of 
marking their debt securities using mid marks.  Other funds explicitly described a 
practice of marking debt securities using bid marks.  Alternatively, a third group of funds 
provided only general information, such as a practice of marking debt securities at fair 
value.   
Bond mutual funds do not use boiler-plate language to describe their marking 
practices within their prospectuses.  For each of the 946 corporate bond funds in our 
sample, we searched the historical prospectuses filed with the SEC for information about 
how it marked bond values for NAV purposes.  Each fund was categorized each reporting 
period as following one of four marking standards:  mid markers clearly stated the use of 
averaged bid and ask quotes when valuing debt securities for NAV purposes; bid markers 
clearly stated the use bid quotes; mid/bid markers used language that implied a 
combination of averages of bid and ask quotes and/or bid quotes; and ambiguous markers 
used only general language to describe their marking policy. 
Panel A of Table 2 reports the frequency of marking standards based on 
information from the last prospectus filed during the sample period.  Interestingly, we 
find that funds are fairly evenly distributed across three marking categories:  mid markers 
(27.91%), bid markers (35.41%), and ambiguous markers (32.45%).  Fewer funds fall 
into the mid/bid marker category (4.23%).  Panel B reports the frequency of changes in 
marking standards and shows that the vast majority of funds started and ended with the 
same marking policy.  Specifically, 824 of the 946 funds in our sample (87%) began and 
finished with the same marking policy.  
Panel C reports statistics on scaled prices derived from the actual prices reported 
separately by bid, mid, and ambiguous markers.  We standardize each bond’s fund-
reported prices based upon a scale where the corresponding Bloomberg bid and ask 
prices are set equal to zero and one, respectively.  The mean scaled price of 0.204 
reported by bid-marking funds is significantly lower than the 0.635 reported by mid-
marking funds.  On average, the bid-marking funds slightly overshoot the Bloomberg bid 
and mid-marking funds slightly overshoot the Bloomberg mid.  But note that the 
difference between mean scaled prices for bid-markers versus mid-markers of 0.431 is   12
roughly the size of the Bloomberg half spread.  The median scaled prices tell a similar 
story.  The median scaled prices of 0.150 reported by bid-marking funds is significantly 
lower than the 0.690 reported by mid-marking funds, and the difference of 0.540 is 
roughly the size of the Bloomberg half spread.  These results reinforce the idea that there 
is content to the mid versus bid prospectus language.  Moreover, the mean and median 
scaled prices for ambiguous markers of 0.452 and 0.433, respectively, fall roughly in the 
middle of those for bid markers and mid markers.  Furthermore, the standard deviation of 
scaled prices within ambiguous markers is significantly higher than that for both bid and 
mid markers.  Thus, the bond marks of ambiguous markers appear to vary more from 
period to period than do the corresponding marks of bid and mid markers.  In contrast, 
the standard deviations of scaled prices of bid markers and mid markers are statistically 
indistinguishable.   
 
4.3.  Marking standards and fund characteristics 
An interesting question is what motivates a fund to choose one marking policy 
over another?  Table 3 provides summary characteristics for bid, mid and ambiguous 
markers.  Dramatic differences are not apparent.  Thus, fund characteristics do not appear 
to be related to the choice of marking policy in an obvious way.  Noteworthy in light of 
our later investigation of whether pricing patterns are consistent with returns smoothing, 
all three marking subgroups show positive serial correlation of monthly returns and daily 
returns.  Positive serial correlation is consistent with returns smoothing, but not the only 
possible cause.  Positive serial correlation, for example, is also consistent with the 
hypothesis that less liquid securities are somehow more susceptible to special security 
marking problems resulting in stale prices.  We later try to disentangle active returns 
smoothing from the potential presence of stale prices. 
 
<Insert Table 3 about here> 
 
4.4.  Marking standards and auditors 
Perhaps the fund’s auditor matters with respect to the choice of marking policy? 
Table 4 reports information on the auditing firms used by bid, mid and ambiguous 
markers.  The auditor information was hand-collected from fund prospectuses and N-  13
SARs.  The client base of each of the big-four auditors is comprised of sizable 
percentages of funds in each of the three bid, mid and ambiguous marking subgroups.  
The frequency of marking standard is also reported for big-four and non-big-four auditors 
as separate groups.  A chi-square test fails to reject the null hypothesis that the 
frequencies of bid, mid and ambiguous marking clients are related to the use of a big-four 
versus a non-big-four auditor.  Thus, the type of a fund’s auditor does not appear to 
explain the choice of marking standard in an obvious way.  Nevertheless, we later explore 
the possibility that the use of other than a big-four auditor was associated with returns 
smoothing behavior.   
 
<Insert Table 4 about here> 
 
4.5.  Marking standards and price clusters 
Given the earlier discussion of how bonds are priced for NAV purposes, it is also 
interesting to know the extent to which bid, mid and ambiguous markers clustered on the 
same price when marking bonds.  If several funds received a feed from a common pricing 
service and did not exercise discretion in adjusting individual bond marks, then price 
clustering would result.  Table 5 presents price cluster information for all bonds.
10  We 
measure the number of price clusters as the number of unique prices observed across 
funds for the same bond on the same date. We see evidence of clustering, but still find a 
considerable spread of different prices across funds.  Across all funds, we observe three 
or more price clusters just over half the time.  When we focus only on bid or mid 
markers, the incidence of three or more clusters drops by roughly half.  The drop is 
expected given the elimination of incidences where two funds used marks from the same 
pricing service without modification, but one fund used the bid price and the other used 
the mid price.  When we focus only on ambiguous markers, we observe three or more 
clusters slightly more than 40 percent of the time regardless of whether the bond was 
investment grade or high yield.  Table 5 also presents information on the fraction of 
positions priced at the mode conditional on there being more than one cluster.  On 
average, regardless of how we split the data, more than half of the positions are priced at 
the mode.  Under the presumption that these mode prices were supplied by a pricing 
                                                 
10 Results were not different when we repeated this analysis separately for investment grade and high yield bonds.   14
service without modification by the funds, we can construct a proxy for exercising 
discretion.  In our later examination of possible return smoothing behavior, we separately 
examine funds that tended to mark bonds at prices different from mode prices.   
 
<Insert Table 5 about here> 
 
5.  Cross-fund price dispersion for the overall sample of funds 
In this section, we examine the cross-fund pricing dispersion of individual bonds.  
As part of this analysis we control for differences related to choice of marking standards, 
and relate pricing dispersion to bond-specific characteristics.  We conclude this section 
by examining the properties of cross-fund pricing dispersion through time.   
 
5.1.  Measures of bond price dispersion  
For each fixed income fund and each reporting period, the Morningstar mutual 
fund holdings database reports the market and par values of each bond position.  We 
calculate the reported price of bond i held by fund j at date t by dividing the reported 
market value of that bond holding by the reported par value of the holding and then 
multiplying by 100.  In other words, the reported price measure that we use can be 
interpreted as the price per each 100 dollars of par value.  For a bond to be included in 
our sample, three or more funds must report the price of the identical bond as of the same 
date.
11  Our sample includes 11,116 distinct corporate bonds and 252,765 bond-date 
observations that satisfy this condition.  
We use the interquartile range (IR) of prices reported by all the funds holding the 
same bond on the same date to measure bond price dispersion across funds.  The resulting 
dispersion statistics are then averaged across bond-date observations.  We report results 
using the interquartile range because the distribution of bond prices across funds is 
negatively skewed and normality is strongly rejected by both the Smirnov-Kolmogorov 
and Anderson-Darling tests.  Nonetheless we also examined the standard deviation and 
                                                 
11 We also ignored all bond positions that were smaller than $10,000 in par value and round our calculated bond prices 
to the fourth decimal point to avoid spurious differences due to rounding errors.   15
average median absolute deviation of prices.  The unreported results using these 
alternative measures of dispersion are qualitatively similar.   
As described above, some funds explicitly state that they mark bonds at mid-
market prices (i.e., the average of the bid and ask prices), whereas other funds explicitly 
state that they mark bonds at bid prices.  Thus if we were to calculate dispersion using 
prices reported by all funds, our dispersion measure would be affected by the magnitude 
of the bid-ask spread.  To control for the different marking standard used by funds, bond 
price dispersion is calculated separately using prices reported by three groups of funds: 
all funds; mid-marking funds; and bid-marking funds. 
 
5.2.  Bond price dispersion and bond characteristics 
Table 6 reports bond price dispersion statistics based on univariate sorts related to 
bond characteristics.  Panel A reports dispersion statistics by credit rating group.  As 
expected, pricing dispersion across funds is generally decreasing in bond credit quality.  
With but one exception, dispersion is significantly lower when computed using marks 
reported exclusively by mid-marking or bid-marking funds.  This finding is consistent 
with a dispersion measure based on all funds’ prices being driven to some extent by the 
bid-ask spread.  Nonetheless, dispersion generally decreases in bond credit quality 
regardless of whether the measure is computed based on all funds, mid-marking funds, or 
bid-marking funds.  Interestingly, pricing dispersion for bonds in default (D-rated) is 
lower relative to even CCC or C-rated bonds.  This is consistent with funds or pricing 
services using marks based on similar recovery rates estimated from similar bonds-in-
default universes. 
Panel B reports dispersion statistics by the size of the issue.  Bonds are ranked on 
issue size annually and then placed into deciles.  The highest-issue-size bonds are placed 
in Decile 1 and the lowest-issue-size bonds are placed in Decile 10.  Also as expected, 
dispersion is nearly monotonically decreasing in issue size.  Again, consistent with 
dispersion based on all funds’ prices being driven to some extent by the bid-ask spread, 
dispersion is significantly lower when computed from marks reported exclusively by 
mid-marking or bid-marking funds.     16
Panel C reports dispersion statistics categorized into four groups defined by the 
time-to-maturity.  Again as expected, dispersion is increasing in time-to-maturity.  Once 
more we find that dispersion is significantly lower when computed from marks reported 
exclusively by mid-marking or bid-marking funds. 
 
<Insert Table 6 about here> 
 
We also examine bond price dispersion using multivariate regression analysis.  
The dependent variable is the cross-fund bond price interquartile range.  Explanatory 
variables include:  Issue Size, the log of the original par value of the bond issue expressed 
in millions of dollars; Maturity, the remaining time to maturity of the bond expressed in 
years; Age, the time elapsed since the bond’s issuance expressed in years (see Hotchkiss, 
Jostova and Warga (2007)); Volatility, the annualized standard deviation of daily 
percentage price changes for the 10-year Treasury Note Futures during the concurrent 
observation month; and a time trend.  Unreported results show, as expected, that the 
cross-fund pricing dispersion is higher for lower credit quality bonds, longer maturity 
bonds, smaller-sized issues, and older bonds.  Dispersion is also higher during periods of 
higher market volatility. 
 
5.3.  A closer look at the time-series of bond price dispersion 
We next take a detailed look at the time-series of bond price dispersion, 
particularly with respect to the impact of TRACE.  TRACE was rolled out on separate 
schedules for four groups of bonds over a 27-month period extending from July 1, 2002 
to September 30, 2004.
12  The first wave of bonds reported through TRACE 
encompassed all investment grade bonds greater than $1 billion in original issue size.
13  
On July 1, 2002 FINRA required dissemination of transaction information for bonds 
meeting these criteria.  Second-wave bonds include all investment grade bonds rated A or 
higher with original issue size of at least $100 million.  These bonds became permanently 
disseminated as of March 1, 2003.  Third-wave bonds comprise all issues rated BBB- to 
                                                 
12 The rollout of TRACE began in July 2002 under the auspices of the NASD (National Association of Securities 
Dealers) to improve corporate bond transparency. FINRA was formed through the consolidation of NASD and the 
member regulation, enforcement and arbitration functions of the New York Stock Exchange in July 2007. 
13 Prices for a refreshed set of 50 highlighted non-investment grade bonds also began being disseminated at this time. 
We incorporate these bonds into our discussion of the full set of high-yield bonds below (the fourth wave).    17
BBB+ with an original issue size less than $1 billion.  The third-wave rolled out in two 
phases.  The initial phase began on April 14, 2003 when FINRA required dissemination 
for a subset of 120 third-wave bonds.  The secondary phase began on September 30, 2004 
when all other bonds meeting third-wave criteria became permanently disseminated.   
TRACE’s fourth wave, the rollout for high-yield bonds, also occurred in two parts.   
FINRA began requiring dissemination of a special subset of 50 highlighted high-yield 
bonds on July 1, 2002.
14  The secondary phase began on September 30, 2004 when all 
other bonds meeting fourth-wave criteria became permanently disseminated.   
Figure 1 shows the time series of the average dispersion for the four Trace bond 
waves.
15  We observe a general pattern of decreasing dispersion for each Trace bond 
wave around the implementation of TRACE.  While the pattern is consistent with the 
transparency-enhancing TRACE system increasing pricing precision, dispersion may 
have fallen for other reasons.  A gradual decline over the entire sample period is 
consistent with other more long-run factors.  For example, the corporate bond market 
may have simply experienced a steady increase in the number of credit analysts and/or 
gradual improvements in credit-scoring models throughout the sample period.  In 
contrast, an abrupt dispersion decrease coincident with first dissemination would be 
consistent with dispersion decreases being related to TRACE.   
Unreported tests examine the pattern of pricing dispersion in tight six-month 
event windows immediately before and after the TRACE dissemination event dates.   
Although the unreported evidence shows a more rapid dispersion decrease for 
disseminated bonds in the tight event windows, non-disseminated bonds also show 
decreases that differ insignificantly from disseminated bonds.  The evidenced is 
consistent with the view that the transparency-enhancing TRACE system contributed to 
increasing pricing precision, including a spillover effect for non-disseminated bonds.   
However, the observed gradual decline over our sample period and the similar dispersion 
                                                 
14 While the number of highlighted high-yield bonds disseminated through TRACE remained constant from July 1, 
2002 to September 30, 2004, the identities of the 50 bonds within this set changed.  A total of 177 different highlighted 
high-yield bonds were disseminated at some point over the transition period. 
15 Since there is a high incidence of dispersion data missing for some of the bond waves prior to December 1998, the 
chart reflects data from December 1998 through December 2006, when the underlying quarterly data was consistently 
available for each of the four bond waves.   18
decline documented for the non-disseminated bonds suggest that TRACE might not have 
been the only source of the decline in pricing dispersion.   
 
6.  Do funds strategically mark bonds to smooth returns? 
Returns smoothing involves managerial use of discretion over marks on 
individual holdings to alter the distribution of reported fund returns.  The presumed goal 
of such returns management is to artificially enhance a fund’s performance statistics to 
attract additional investment inflows.  The mechanics of returns smoothing are based on 
the fact that fund performance is typically measured by comparing reported returns to an 
appropriate index.  When the fund’s underlying assets perform poorly relative to the 
index, marking discretion is used to boost reported returns by pricing individual holdings 
higher.  Conversely when the fund’s underlying assets perform well relative to the index, 
marking discretion is used to “bank” returns for the future by pricing individual holdings 
lower.   
Thus, the returns smoothing hypothesis makes several testable predictions.  When 
the fund reports returns that underperform the index, we ought to observe high marks on 
individual bond positions.  When the fund reports returns that outperform the index, we 
ought to observe low marks on individual bond positions.  Our first set of tests examines 
whether we observe this pattern of marks for individual bond positions.   
Returns smoothing will also alter the returns reported by funds.  When the fund’s 
underlying assets show weak performance, the fund will use marking discretion to boost 
reported returns.  Conversely when the fund’s underlying assets show strong 
performance, the fund will use marking discretion to hold back on the reported returns.  
As argued by Getmansky et al., returns smoothing will thus cause reported returns to not 
fully incorporate the available economic information, leading to a less than one-for-one 
relation between reported returns and the true economic returns of the underlying assets.  
Our second set of tests examines whether we observe this pattern of marks for the returns 
reported by funds. 
In the analysis that follows, we separately examine several fund subgroups that 
may have more discretion in the marking of bonds.  These funds may use such discretion 
to more aggressively manage fund performance statistics through returns smoothing.  The   19
first subgroup we examine separately is ambiguous markers.  Recall that SEC guidance 
gives funds discretion in the method used to mark bond values for NAV purposes.  SEC 
case precedent, however, suggests that deviation from policies stated in the prospectus 
exposes fund management companies to potential legal liability.
16  Thus, we might 
expect bid and mid markers to closely follow their explicitly stated policies when 
marking bonds for NAV purposes.  Ambiguous markers, in contrast, do not disclose 
details about marking policies in their prospectuses.  Thus, these funds do not operate 
under any self-imposed, explicitly stated policy.  Fair value guidance under SEC 
Accounting Series Release No. 118 is not extraordinarily restrictive, especially as it 
permits funds to “use a valuation within the range of bid and asked prices considered 
best to represent value in the circumstances.”  Thus, ambiguous markers may retain 
more discretion in the marking of bonds than bid or mid markers.   
 
<Insert Table 7 about here> 
 
We also examine whether the tendency to mark positions differently from prices 
at which other funds cluster is associated with returns smoothing behavior.  The 
presumption is that if we observe a cluster of funds marking a bond at the same price on 
the same date, then the cluster price was likely supplied by a pricing service without 
modification by the funds.  Funds that tend to mark bonds at prices different from cluster 
prices therefore more likely exercise marking discretion. 
Following similar logic, we also explore the possibility that the tendency for a 
fund to mark positions differently from other funds in the same family is associated with 
returns smoothing behavior.  The presumption is that funds that mark at prices different 
from other funds in the same family more likely exercise marking discretion. 
Finally, we investigate whether the use of other than a big-four auditor is 
associated with returns smoothing behavior.  Under the presumption that big-four 
                                                 
16 For example, Nevis Capital allocated all shares of IPOs that it acquired to only two of its clients, the Nevis Fund and 
Snowdon, but failed to disclose this practice to its other clients that were eligible to participate in IPOs. This practice 
was contrary to the Nevis Capital's claims in its Form ADV filed with the SEC that the firm would treat all of its clients 
equally, on a pro-rata basis.  This provided the basis for the legal action taken against Nevis Capital by the SEC which 
accused this investment adviser of fraudulent conduct by making false and misleading statements and engaging in 
fraudulent and deceptive practices (see, for example, http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/ia-2214.htm).    20
auditors are more exacting in their pricing standards, funds that used a smaller auditor 
have more marking discretion.   
 
6.1.  Individual bond marks:  Test design 
Our analysis of individual bond marks treats each holding by each fund on each 
date as a separate observation.  For this part of the analysis, we focus on observations 
marked at a price either greater than or equal to the Bloomberg mid price or less than or 
equal to the Bloomberg bid price.
17  Eighty percent, or 405,026, of the observations 
satisfy these criteria.  We specify the relationship between individual bond marks and 
explanatory variables using a logit model.  The dependent variable is constructed as an 
indicator variable, taking a value of one if the price is equal to or greater than the 
Bloomberg mid price and zero if the price is equal to or less than the Bloomberg bid 
price.  
Key in the tests for returns smoothing are explanatory variables that reflect 
whether the fund underperformed or outperformed relative to an appropriate index.  We 
benchmark the returns reported by funds invested primarily in investment-grade bonds 
against the Lehman Corporate Bond Index and the returns reported by funds invested 
primarily in high-yield bonds against the Lehman High-Yield Bond Index.  We compute 
an index-adjusted return for each fund each month based on the fund’s reported return 
over the prior twelve-months relative to the index.  We then rank all positive index-
adjusted returns.  We construct an indicator variable, Positive Return, set equal to one if 
the observation is in the top third of the positive index-adjusted returns and to zero 
otherwise.  We then separately rank all negative index-adjusted returns and construct an 
indicator variable, Negative Return, in an analogous manner.   
We also construct indicator variables for the calendar and fiscal year ends.  Fiscal 
year ends were hand-collected from each fund’s prospectus or N-SAR report.  The 
rationale for including Calendar Year end is that funds may have been more apt to 
engage in returns smoothing at a time when investors were more likely attuned to fund 
                                                 
17 We excluded observations lying between the Bloomberg bid and mid quotes to remove any ambiguity related to 
whether those observations represented bid or mid quotes.  Nevertheless, we also conducted our tests using a two-level 
categorization based on whether a price is strictly above or below the average of the Bloomberg bid and mid quotes, 
and the results were qualitatively similar.   21
performance.  The rationale for including Fiscal Year end is that funds may have faced 
increased auditor scrutiny and were hence less apt to engage in returns smoothing. 
The final explanatory variables are based on the fund subgroups described above.  
Ambiguous Marker is an indicator variable equal to one if the fund is categorized as an 
ambiguous marker.  Cluster Divergent is an indicator variable used to identify funds that 
tended to mark bonds at prices different from cluster prices.  To construct the variable 
Cluster Divergent, for each fund and each period we calculate the fraction of bonds held 
that are marked differently from the two most populated price clusters (divergent 
fraction).  We then average the divergent fraction across all report dates for a particular 
fund.  We rank all funds based on their average divergent fraction and split the sample 
into terciles.  Cluster Divergent is set equal to one for funds in the top tercile. Family 
Disagreement is an indicator variable used to identify funds that tended to mark bonds at 
prices different from funds in the same family.  To construct the variable Family 
Disagreement, for each fund and each period we calculate the fraction of bonds held that 
are marked differently from at least one other fund belonging to the same mutual fund 
family (disagreement fraction).  We then average the disagreement fraction across all 
report dates for a particular fund.  We rank all funds based on their average disagreement 
fraction and split the sample into terciles.  Family Disagreement is set equal to one for 
the top tercile.  Not Big Four Auditor is an indicator variable set equal to one if the 
underlying fund is not audited by one of the big four auditors.
18  Each of the subgroup 
indicator variables are interacted with the Positive Return and Negative Return variables 
to test for differential returns smoothing behavior.   
 
6.2.  Individual bond marks:  Evidence 
The results in Table 7 show a positive and significant loading on Negative Return 
for all of the logit model specifications. These results imply that the probability of 
observing a bond price equal to or above the Bloomberg mid (a “high mark”) is larger 
when the fund reports returns that underperform the index. Results also show a negative 
and significant loading on Positive Return for all of the logit model specifications. These 
                                                 
18 An alternative version of this variable based on whether the underlying fund is audited by PricewaterhouseCoopers 
versus other auditors produced qualitatively similar results.    22
results imply that the probability of observing a bond price equal to or below the 
Bloomberg bid (a “low mark”) is larger when the fund reports returns that outperform the 
index. Both results are consistent with the returns smoothing hypothesis. 
These Table 7 results are inconsistent with either random mispricing or stale 
pricing.  To see this, consider a fund that did not exercise discretion over marks and held 
a portfolio that mirrored the index.  Suppose that, because of either random mispricing or 
stale pricing, the fund marked the bonds it held either higher or lower than the prices used 
to calculate the index return.  If the fund exhibited a random or stale-pricing-induced 
downward marking bias at the end of a given period, then it would show a negative 
index-adjusted return for the period.  Conversely an upward marking bias would result in 
a positive index-adjusted return.  Thus, random mispricing or stale pricing hypotheses 
generate testable predictions that run counter to the positive and significant loading on 
Negative Return and the negative and significant loading on Positive Return.   
In model (2), the loadings on Calendar Year and Fiscal Year differ insignificantly 
from zero.  The implication is that the pattern of marks consistent with return smoothing 
behavior does not differ over the course of the year.   
In models (3) through (6), the loadings differ insignificantly from zero for the 
coefficients on the fund subgroups possibly having more marking discretion.  Caveats, 
however, are warranted when interpreting these results.  First, the subgroups singled out 
for separate examination may not differ from the rest of the sample with respect to the 
degree of marking discretion.  Perhaps, for example, the bond marking scrutiny applied 
by Big Four auditors was no different than those applied by smaller auditors.  Second, the 
logit model only provides evidence on the probability of observing a high or low bond 
price given certain conditions; it does not estimate the full economic impact of smoothing 
on the returns reported by funds.  We now turn to an examination of whether reported 
returns exhibit evidence consistent with return smoothing.     
 
6.3.  Reported returns:  Test design 
Getmansky, Lo and Makarov (2004) estimate a returns model for hedge funds 
applicable to all funds that hold illiquid assets (such as our corporate bond mutual funds).  
In the model, fund j’s reported or observable return in month t is denoted
0
,t j R .  The fund’s   23
true economic return, which is assumed to be unobservable in their sample of hedge 
funds, is denoted t j R , .  The true economic return reflects the flow of information that 
would determine the equilibrium value of the fund’s securities in a frictionless market.  
The observable reported returns are modeled as a finite moving average of the 
unobservable true economic returns.  For example, regression equation (1) is a returns 




0 =α +θj,0 R j,t +θj,1 R j,t-1 +θj,2 R j,t-2 +ε j,t.                        (1) 
 
The key coefficient in equation (1) is  0 , j θ , which indicates how much of the true 
economic return is reported in the current month.  A  0 , j θ  value less than one means that, 
consistent with smoothed returns, on average fund j reported less than 100% of the 
current month’s true economic return.  A  0 , j θ  value equal to one means that on average 
fund j reported the current month’s true economic return.
19  
Since hedge fund assets are not observable, Getmansky et al. fit their model using 
only reported returns and employ econometric techniques in multiple steps to estimate the 
0 , j θ  coefficients.  Our procedure differs from Getmansky et al. in that we estimate 
equation (1) directly using true economic returns based on actual bond holdings.  For our 
sample of bond mutual funds, we develop a “custom benchmark” to derive each fund’s 
true economic return since we directly observe the underlying assets held on all report 
dates. 
For robustness, we apply two alternative measures for the bond prices used to 
value each bond position held by any fund.  One measure is a “consensus” price 
calculated as the cross-fund median price of all bond prices reported by all funds.  The 
other measure is the Bloomberg mid price.
20  Using these Bloomberg prices in the 
                                                 
19 A θj,0  value greater than one would imply that fund j marked its positions in a way that increased its returns volatility 
relative to its contemporaneous true economic returns (technically feasible but hard to motivate). 
20 Bloomberg reports end-of-month bond bid and ask quotes that combine information from different dealers or price 
sources.  Sometimes when quotes are not available (especially post-TRACE), a trade price is provided in which case 
both the reported bid and ask prices are set equal to each other.   24
context of a robustness check makes sense since these prices are independent of any fund 
manager’s specific endogenous decisions about how to mark bonds for NAV purposes.   
Our two estimates of each fund’s true economic return are the returns that the 
fund would have experienced had it marked its own individual bond holdings at either 
consensus prices or Bloomberg prices.  Our exact procedure for estimating the true 
economic return begins by calculating a “portfolio spread” measured as the percentage 
difference between the value of a fund’s portfolio of corporate bond positions using the 
fund’s own marks and the value of those same positions remarked using either consensus 
prices or Bloomberg prices. As discussed above, for a bond to be included in our sample, 
three or more funds must report the price of the identical bond as of the same date.  For 
each bond i meeting this requirement at date t, we calculate a price measure, Pricei,t, 
either as the consensus price (measured as the median price reported by all funds) or the 
Bloomberg price (measured as the average of the Bloomberg bid and ask quotes).  Next, 
for each fund j at each date t, we identify all bonds held with valid prices.  The 
independently computed value of all such bonds held by fund j at date t is calculated as 
follows: 
 
   t j i
N
i






,                  (2) 
 
where  t j i ParValue , ,  is the reported par value of bond i held by fund j at date t.  Employing 
the same set of bonds used to calculate  t j, Price  we compute the reported value for fund j 







t j, i, t j, i, t j, Value   Par Price   Reported Value   Reported .            (3) 
 
The reported value reflects the prices used in the fund NAV calculation. The portfolio 
spread, defined as the percentage difference between the reported and independently 
computed values for fund j at date t, is calculated as  
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and computed for each fund holding at least ten bonds with valid dealer prices in a given 
month.   
We next calculate the percentage change in the portfolio due to the change in the 
portfolio spread as 
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Under our method,  t j R ,  reflects the component of the portfolio return that is not affected 
by the idiosyncratic marking behavior of the fund manager. 
 
6.4.  Reported returns: Evidence 
In Table 8, we estimate regression equation (1) to generate returns smoothing 
profiles for all funds and for fund subgroups possibly having different marking 
discretion.  Results using Bloomberg prices and consensus prices to estimate economic 
returns are reported in Panels A and B, respectively.  Our estimation period covers the 
entire sample period and includes all funds with ten or more valid (non-missing) 
Bloomberg-based and consensus-based return observations.  Two hundred sixty-six funds 
meet these criteria.   
 
<Insert Table 8 about here> 
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Again, as in Table 7, the sub-groups of funds that we examine are based on 
marking policy; tendency to mark positions differently from the most popular prices used 
by all funds; tendency to mark positions differently from other funds in the family; and 
tendency to use a big four versus a non-big four auditing.  We classify funds based on the 
tendency to mark positions differently from the most popular prices used by all funds by 
ranking all funds based on their average cluster divergent fraction into terciles.  Funds 
classified as High Cluster Divergent funds are funds in the top tercile and Low Cluster 
Divergent funds are funds in the bottom tercile.  We classify funds based on the tendency 
to mark positions in disagreement with other funds from the same family by ranking all 
funds based on their average disagreement fraction into terciles.  Funds classified as High 
Family Disagreement funds are funds in the top tercile and Low Family Disagreement 
funds are funds in the bottom tercile. 
In Panel A of Table 8, the first column shows that the  0 θ  coefficient for all funds 
is 0.925, significantly less than one in both economic and statistical terms.  The result 
implies that the idiosyncratic part of the typical funds’ reported return moved in the 
opposite direction of the contemporaneous true economic return calculated using 
Bloomberg prices.  The remaining columns in Panel A show that the  0 θ  coefficient 
regardless of subgroup is also significantly less than one.  Panel B shows that the key 
result that the  0 θ  coefficient is less than one holds when consensus prices are used to 
calculate true economic returns.  The result that the idiosyncratic part of a funds’ reported 
return moved in the opposite direction of the contemporaneous true economic return is 
consistent with returns smoothing.  Of course, the result is also consistent with a fund 
holding illiquid bonds susceptible to stale pricing problems.   
Thus, in Table 9, where we compare the value of   0 θ  coefficients across fund 
subgroups, we are careful to control for the characteristics of bonds held by the fund.  We 
first estimate equation (1) for each fund separately.  The resulting  0 θ  coefficient for each 
fund serves as the dependent variable in regressions employing both the subgroup 
indicator variables and controls for the characteristics of bonds held.  The Cluster 
Divergent and Family Disagreement indicator variables are constructed as in Section 6.1.    27
In the first specification, we directly control for bond characteristics associated 
with liquidity:  Non-Investment Grade is the value-weighted percentage of the fund 
portfolio invested in non-investment grade bonds; Issue Size is the value-weighted 
average of the issue size of all bonds in the fund portfolio; and Maturity is the value-
weighted average of the time-to-maturity of bonds in the portfolio.  In the second 
specification, we control for differences associated with liquidity using TRACE trade 
characteristics: Trades is the weighted average number of trades reported in TRACE in 
the month prior to the fund holdings report date; and Last Trade Distance is the weighted 
average number of days from the last trade reported in TRACE. In the third specification, 
we use a summary measure of liquidity, Price Range.  We calculate the price range of a 
given bond on a given date as the difference between the highest and lowest price 
reported by all funds holding the bond on the same date.  Earlier evidence presented in 
this study suggests that bonds with higher price ranges are the most illiquid bonds.  For 
each fund and each report date, we calculate Price Range as the value-weighted price 
range for all the bonds in the underlying portfolio.   
 
<Insert Table 9 about here> 
 
Results when Bloomberg prices and consensus prices are used to estimate 
economic returns are reported in Panels A and B, respectively, of Table 9.  An interesting 
result is the negative and significant coefficient on Ambiguous Marker regardless of 
model specification and regardless of whether Bloomberg prices or consensus prices are 
used to calculate economic returns.
21  The smaller  0 θ  coefficient for ambiguous markers 
compared to bid and mid markers is consistent with the hypothesis that the lack of an 
explicitly stated marking policy provided managers with increased cover to strategically 
smooth reported fund returns.   
Another interesting result is the negative and significant coefficient on Price 
Range regardless of whether Bloomberg prices or consensus prices are used to calculate 
                                                 
21 The negative and significant coefficient on Ambiguous Marker in Table 9 does not conflict with the logit results 
presented in Table 7.  The logit model only provides evidence on the probability of observing a high or low bond price 
given certain conditions; it does not estimate the full economic impact of smoothing on the returns reported by funds.  
In contrast, Table 9 results reflect the economic magnitude of marking divergences for individual positions, market 
value of individual positions relative to fund net asset value, and strategic coordination of marks across multiple 
positions on a given date.   28
economic returns.  Although Price Range serves as a proxy for liquidity and potential 
stale-price problems, it also has another interpretation in the context of the returns 
smoothing hypothesis.  Funds holding portfolios of high price range bonds possess 
greater leeway in marking bonds up or down because the range of marks reported by 
other funds is wider. The wider the range of marks by other funds, the easier it is to 
justify one’s own marking choice as reasonable. 
 
7.  Conclusions 
This paper has analyzed important aspects of US corporate bond pricing by 
mutual funds and related issues in bond market structure and transparency.  Our analysis 
focused on the dispersion of month-end valuations placed on identical bonds by different 
funds for NAV purposes.  We uncovered and analyzed some systematic differences in 
bond-holdings valuations that incorporate the impact of differences in fund bid versus 
mid bond value marking standards.  More fundamentally, our mutual fund bond valuation 
data allowed us to assess the difficulty of marking illiquid securities.  Our results indicate 
that cross-fund bond price dispersion falls as bond credit quality increases, rises for 
longer bond time-to-maturity, and falls for larger bond issue size.  Furthermore, price 
dispersion for individual bonds tends to be higher when underlying market volatility is 
high.   
We also find that bond price dispersion declined over our sample period.  A 
gradual decline over the entire sample period is consistent with a number of explanations.  
One contributing factor to this decline in dispersion may have been the dramatic 
improvement in corporate bond market transparency due to the roll-out of FINRA’s 
TRACE system beginning in July 2002.  While previous research has focused on the 
salutary impacts of TRACE on bond trade execution costs, the improvement in market 
transparency may have had more general benefits.  This decrease in price dispersion over 
time is consistent with the hypothesis that the trade transparency generated by TRACE 
has increased the precision of bond pricing for NAV purposes, an “unanticipated 
consequence” of TRACE implementation that is beneficial to mutual fund investors.   
Nevertheless, the observed gradual decline over our entire sample period and associated   29
dispersion declines documented for the uninvolved bonds strongly suggest that TRACE 
was not the only factor behind the decline in bond price dispersion. 
Finally, we investigated whether the marking patterns of bond mutual funds may 
be associated with returns smoothing behavior.  Tests focused on the individual marks 
revealed that (1) the probability of observing a “high mark” was larger when the fund 
reported returns that underperformed the index and (2) the probability of observing a 
“low mark” was larger when the fund reported returns that outperformed the index.  Both 
results are consistent with returns smoothing.  A second set of tests of the returns 
smoothing hypothesis focused instead on explaining observed fund returns.  We 
employed a variant of Getmansky, Lo and Makarov’s (2004) approach to generate returns 
smoothing profiles for all funds and for fund subgroups possibly having different levels 
of marking discretion.  We constructed a “custom benchmark” for each fund’s true 
economic return based upon revaluing actual fund holdings for each fund on all report 
dates using a common set of bond marks.  Our estimates imply that the idiosyncratic part 
of a fund’s reported return moved in the opposite direction of the contemporaneous true 
economic return.  This is consistent with returns smoothing.  The quantitative importance 
of such smoothing was larger for funds that we classify as “ambiguous” markers.  This 
finding is consistent with the hypothesis that the lack of an explicitly stated marking 
policy (e.g., always mark at “bid” or “mid”) provided managers with increased cover to 
strategically smooth reported fund returns.  Furthermore, the quantitative importance of 
such smoothing was larger for funds holding portfolios of bonds with wide price ranges 
(i.e., “hard-to-mark” bonds).  Such funds have greater leeway in marking bonds up or 
down because the wider the range of marks by other funds makes it easier to justify one’s 
own marking choice as reasonable.  Taken altogether, the results suggest that managers 
of funds that lack an explicitly stated marking policy and hold portfolios of bonds that 
have the largest marking uncertainty are most prone to smooth reported fund returns.  
Our finding of a differential impact of ambiguous versus explicit fund marking 
policies on returns smoothing is of immediate practical interest.  From a regulatory 
perspective, we see little downside to requiring each mutual fund to explicitly state its 
marking standard in its prospectus.  Regulatory strategies for dealing with returns 
smoothing by funds that specialize in hard-to-mark bonds may be more difficult to   30
formulate.  Moreover, hedge fund managers generally share the motive, means and 
mismarking opportunities available to those mutual fund managers with ambiguous 
marking standards and/or that hold hard-to-mark bonds.  Thus, taken together with the 
Getmansky et al. and Bollen and Pool (2008, 2009) evidence, our findings suggest that an 
in-depth evaluation of the security valuation practices of individual hedge funds may be a 
worthwhile endeavor for both the hedge fund industry itself and its would-be regulators 
towards the goal of identifying and eliminating returns smoothing by managers.    31
Table 1 
Corporate Bond Ownership Statistics 
 
The following table reports ownership statistics for bonds that are held by 2,268 bond mutual 
funds that reported their holdings to Morningstar during the 1995-2006 period.  The reported 
statistics are for the set of 15,291 non-convertible corporate bond securities categorized as such 
by FISD. Data on bond credit ratings, issue sizes, and maturity dates came from FISD. The Own 
Ratio is calculated for each bond in a given year as the percentage of the total outstanding issue 
size held by all 2,268 bond mutual funds.  The Own Number is calculated for each bond in a 
given year as the number of funds holding that bond.  As in Falkenstein (1996), both these 
variables are calculated every year and use the latest holdings report in a given year for a given 
mutual fund. The average and median values reported below are taken across year-bond 
observations (there are 71,568 year-bond observations). Panel A reports ownership statistics for 
all bonds. Panel B reports mean and median values for the ownership statistics by credit rating 
group. Each credit rating group is constructed such that, for example, all BBB-, BBB and BBB+ 
bonds are categorized as one group, BBB. Panel C reports statistics categorized by the size of the 
issue. Each year bonds are ranked on issue size and sorted into deciles where the highest-issue-
size bonds are placed in Decile 1 and lowest-issue-size bonds are placed in Decile 10.  Ownership 
statistics categorized into 4 groups defined by the time to maturity are reported in Panel D.  
 

















                    
Own                    
Ratio (%)    9.50    0.002    1.67    5.10    12.77    99.95 
Own                    
Number    12    1   2   6    15    204 
 
Panel B. Ownership Statistics By Credit Quality
Credit 
Rating 
  Own Ratio (%)    Own Number     
  Mean Median    Mean Median    Observations 
AAA    4.75 2.23    6.83 3.00    1,670 
AA    4.26 2.29    6.27 3.00    5,018 
A    4.69 2.80    8.06 4.00    20,245 
BBB    7.12 4.79    11.72 6.00    20,534 
BB    15.89 13.61    19.19 12.00    6,986 
B    21.86 20.75    21.35 16.00    8,477 
CCC    19.03 16.24    18.12 13.00    2,499 
CC    13.21 10.18    11.93 8.00    359 
C    15.07 12.44    14.56 11.00    185 
D    10.53 6.79    7.99 5.00    1,400 
NR    10.94 6.25    8.55 4.00    3,219 
               
Inv. Grade    5.64 3.35    9.22 4.00    46,730 
High-yield    18.39 16.14    19.01 13.00    19,906 




Panel C. Ownership Statistics By Issue Size 
Issue Size 
Decile 
  Own Ratio (%)    Own Number     
  Mean Median    Mean Median    Observations 
1 (Highest)    7.29 5.14    29.61  21.00   7,306 
2    8.58 5.42    18.36  13.00   7,295 
3    9.18 5.35    15.29  10.00   6,831 
4    9.62 5.21    13.36  8.00   6,815 
5    8.78 4.47    9.57  5.00   8,543 
6    9.88 4.86    9.07  5.00   6,300 
7   10.33  5.20    8.76  5.00    7,406 
8    11.44 6.28    8.40 5.00   6,223 
9    9.80 5.00    5.19  3.00   8,073 
10(Lowest)    10.58 4.80    2.70 1.00   6,776 
 
 
Panel D. Ownership Statistics By Time to Maturity 
Time to 
Maturity 
  Own Ratio (%)    Own Number     
  Mean Median    Mean Median    Observations 
≤2 years    7.08 3.66    8.14  4.00    16,003 
(2, 5]    9.55 5.70    12.55  7.00    19,350 
(5,10]    13.08 7.67    16.65  9.00   22,846 
>10 years    6.19 3.59    8.18  4.00    13,157 
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Table 2 
Frequency Analysis by Pricing Standard 
 
This table reports information on the pricing standards that funds use to compute their net asset values. 
Fund-specific pricing standard information was hand-collected from prospectuses filed by funds with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), available on the SEC website.  A fund is classified as a Mid 
Marker if its prospectus states clearly that it uses the average of bid and ask quotes or prices when valuing 
debt securities for the purposes of calculating its net asset values.  A fund is classified as a Bid Marker if its 
prospectus clearly states that the fund uses bid quotes or prices.  A fund is classified as Mid/Bid Marker 
when language from its prospectus implies a combination of pricing standards (bid quotes and/or averages 
of bid and ask quotes).  A fund is classified as an Ambiguous Marker when its prospectus does not disclose 
whether the fund specifically uses a bid or mid-marking standard, but rather uses general language to 
describe its pricing policy.  Panel A reports the frequency of pricing standards based on information from 
the latest prospectus filed by each fund.  Panel B reports the frequency of changes in pricing standards.  
Panel C reports statistics on standardized bond prices for prices reported separately by bid-marking, mid-
marking, and ambiguous-marking funds. For a particular bond-date observation to be included in our 
analysis, we require that a price is reported for that bond by at least one mid-marking, one bid-marking, and 
one ambiguous marker fund. Next, using Bloomberg bid and ask quotes, we normalize reported prices 
relative to Bloomberg quotes such that Bloomberg bid price equals 0 and the Bloomberg ask price equals 
one for a particular bond. We first aggregate and compute statistics for all prices reported for a particular 
bond on a given date and then average these statistics across all bond-date observations.   
 
Panel A. Frequency by Pricing Standard 
Pricing Standard    #    % 
Bid Marker    335    35.41 
Mid Marker   264    27.91 
Mid/Bid Marker    40    4.23 
Ambiguous Marker    307   32.45 
Total   946    100% 
 
Panel B. Frequency of Changes in Pricing Standards 









Beginni1ng Pricing Standard  #  %  #  %  #  %  #  % 
Bid Marker  287  30.34  18  1.9  1  0.11  23  2.43 
Mid Marker  27 2.85  235  24.84 1 0.11 20 2.11 
Mid/Bid Marker  0  0  0  0  38  4.02  0  0 
Ambiguous  Marker  21 2.22 11  1.16  0  0  264  27.91 
 
Panel C. Comparisons of Standardized Prices Across Different Pricing Standards 
      












Markers Difference  p-value Difference p-value Difference p-value 
Mean 0.204  0.635  0.452 0.431  (0.00) 0.247 (0.00) -0.183 (0.00) 
Median 0.150  0.690  0.433  0.540 (0.00) 0.283 (0.00) -0.257 (0.00) 
St.Dev. 0.622  0.625  0.873  0.003  (0.93) 0.252 (0.00) 0.249 (0.00)   34
Table 3 
Characteristics of funds with ambiguous and explicitly stated marking policies 
 
This table reports fund characteristics for funds classified by transparency of marking standard.  Funds with ambiguous marking policies are funds that never 
disclosed their pricing standard in any of their prospectuses.  Funds with explicitly stated marking policies are funds that disclosed their pricing standard in their 
prospectus filed with the SEC. Mid markers and bid markers are funds that used mid or bid marking standards consistently through time. Fund characteristics are 
averaged across all observations belonging to a particular fund and the statistics reported in this table are based on the cross-section of funds.  Credit rating, issue 
size, time to maturity, number of trades, and distance from last trade are calculated as the weighted average of the bond characteristics comprising each portfolio 
each date, with weights equal to the market value of each bond position as reported by the fund.  Number of trades and distance from last trade for each bond in 
each portfolio are computed using TRACE data for the period October 2004-December 2006.  Serial correlations of daily returns are computed using daily fund 
returns, available in the CRSP Mutual Fund database for the January 2001-December 2006 period.  For comparability, serial correlations of monthly fund returns 
have also been computed over the January 2001-December 2006 period.  Bond Issue Size, Fund Family Assets, and Fund Assets are reported in $ millions.  
 
 
  Funds with Ambiguous 
Marking Policies 
  Funds with Explicitly 





Characteristic    Mean Median    Mean Median    Mean Median    Mean Median 
Bond Credit Rating    BBB BBB+    BBB BBB+    BBB BBB+    BBB BBB+ 
Bond Issue Size ($ millions)    702 672    743 707    741 703    736 729 
Bond Time to Maturity (Years)    7 7    8 7    7 7    8 8 
Portfolio % in Non-Investment Grade Bonds    42.62 28.86    38.18 23.95    36.26 19.70    38.31 23.77 
Bond Number of Trades    125 110    134 123    136 129    126 119 
Bond Distance from Last Trade (days)    13 10    11 9    11 9    11 9 
Family Assets ($ millions)    104,985 21,714    104,394 25,440    146,995 30,714    83,028 25,189 
Number of Family Funds    149 134    204 121    216 98    201 144 
Fund Assets ($ millions)    548 149    488 146    389 128    439 135 
Fund Turnover (%)    137 98    176 112    183 117    185 121 
Fund Expense Ratio (%)    0.88 0.85    0.87 0.80    0.84 0.81    0.91 0.81 
Average Fund Return (%)    0.44 0.44    0.44 0.44    0.42 0.43    0.43 0.44 
Standard Deviation of Fund Returns (%)    1.17 1.11    1.17 1.09    1.16 1.07    1.15 1.08 
Serial Correlation of Monthly Returns (%)    11.53 7.78    10.84 7.45    10.82 7.11    10.61 8.11 
Serial Correlation of Daily Returns (%)    7.48 3.79    6.60 2.47    6.11 2.42    6.97 2.32 
Fraction of Load Funds (%)    59.75    64.51    60.08    68.28 
Number of Funds    264    682    284    233 
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Table 4 
Frequency analysis by auditor 
 
This table reports information on the firms used by mutual funds to audit their annual statements. 
Fund-specific auditor information was hand-collected from N-SAR reports and prospectuses filed 
by funds with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), available on the SEC website.   
Statistics on the frequency funds audited by the various auditors are reported. The frequency of 
funds audited by each auditor that are Bid Marker, Mid Marker, or Ambiguous Marker Funds are 
also reported.  
 
Frequency of Funds and Marking Standards by Auditor  










Auditor Name    # %    % %  % 
Big Four Auditors:             
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP    352 37.21    37.50 18.47  44.03 
ERNST & YOUNG LLP    218 23.04    36.24 35.78  27.98 
DELOITTE & TOUCHE LLP    155 16.38    29.03 37.42  33.55 
KPMG LLP    149 15.75    30.87 42.28  26.85 
             
All Big Four Auditors:    877 92.71    34.55  30.22  35.23 
Not Big Four Auditors:    69 7.29   37.68 26.09  36.23 
Total    946 100.00   34.78 29.92  35.31 
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Table 5 
Frequency of positions by cluster 
 
This table reports the frequency of bonds with a given number of price clusters. For each 
date and bond held by at least three mutual funds, the number of price clusters is 
determined based on the prices reported by all the mutual funds that hold positions in that 
particular bond. Identification of clusters is conducted for the positions of all funds, of 
only Bid Markers, only Mid Markers, and only Ambiguous Markers.  The last column 
reports the fraction of all positions that are priced at the most popular price conditional on 
there being more than one distinct price reported by all mutual funds. 
 
    Fraction of Bonds with a Given Number of Price Clusters   Fraction  of 
    Number of Price Clusters   Positions 
    1 2  3 or more    Priced at Mode 
All Funds    12.30 36.67 51.03   57.46 
          
Bid Markers    34.35 41.81 23.84   65.67 
          
Mid Markers    21.86 50.88 27.26   63.39 
          
Ambiguous    15.80 44.10 40.10   58.16 
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Table 6 
Bond Price Dispersion-Univariate Sorts 
 
This table reports price dispersion statistics for bonds that are held by at least 3 mutual 
funds at the same date. There are 252,765 bond-date observations that satisfy this 
condition, corresponding to 11,116 corporate bonds. Bond price dispersion is calculated 
separately using prices reported by three groups of funds: all funds; mid-marking funds; 
and bid-marking funds. For a particular bond at a particular date we calculate the 
interquartile range (IR) of the prices reported by the various mutual funds that reported 
ownership of that bond. The resulting dispersion statistics are then averaged across bond-
date observations. Panel A reports dispersion statistics by credit rating group. Each credit 
rating group is constructed such that, for example, all BBB-, BBB, and BBB+ bonds are 
categorized as one group, BBB.  Panel B reports statistics categorized by the size of the 
issue. Each year bonds are ranked on issue size and sorted into deciles where the highest-
issue-size bonds are placed in Decile 1 and lowest-issue-size bonds are placed in Decile 
10.  Panel C reports dispersion statistics categorized into 4 groups defined by the time to 
maturity. *** and ** denote statistical significance at the 1% and 5% level for the 
difference in dispersion between All Funds’ prices and Bid Markers’ and Mid Markers’ 
prices. 
 
Panel A. Price Dispersion Statistics By Credit Quality 
  All Funds’ Prices  Bid Markers’ Prices  Mid Markers’ Prices 
Credit Rating  Dispersion   Obs.  Dispersion   Obs.  Dispersion   Obs. 
AAA  0.228  4,211 0.130*** 1,696 0.167*** 1,176 
AA  0.255  10,874  0.143*** 4,385 0.162*** 2,733 
A  0.281  59,612 0.174*** 26,490 0.198*** 17,215 
BBB  0.332  73,847 0.210*** 36,663 0.255*** 26,758 
BB  0.542  32,831 0.364*** 16,444 0.386*** 17,141 
B  0.554  46,754 0.401*** 23,650 0.349*** 28,763 
CCC  0.604  11,350  0.489*** 5,402 0.346*** 6,574 
CC  0.679  911 0.352*** 207 0.428*** 447 
C 0.712  620  0.668  143  0.521**  393 
D 0.571  3,674  0.425***  669  0.493**  1,709 
NR  0.503  6,733 0.329*** 1,898 0.358*** 2,891 
        
Inv. Grade  0.303  148,544  0.190*** 69,234 0.227*** 47,882 
High-yield  0.559  96,140 0.399*** 46,515 0.367*** 55,027 
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Table 6-Continued 
 
Panel B. Price Dispersion Statistics By Issue Size 
  All Funds’ Prices  Bid Markers’ Prices  Mid Markers’ Prices 
Issue Size Decile  Dispersion  Obs.  Dispersion  Obs.  Dispersion  Obs. 
1  (Highest)  0.241  24,105 0.141*** 11,615 0.206*** 10,505 
2  0.301  26,434 0.193*** 11,793 0.247*** 10,564 
3  0.369  23,500 0.240*** 11,881 0.285*** 10,748 
4  0.370  27,525 0.260*** 11,806 0.277*** 11,288 
5  0.436  24,603 0.281*** 12,025 0.302*** 10,245 
6  0.422  25,650 0.327*** 10,825 0.335*** 10,260 
7  0.442  24,757 0.309*** 12,253 0.320*** 10,695 
8  0.454  26,842 0.322*** 11,843 0.328*** 10,707 
9  0.513  24,056 0.350*** 12,042 0.345*** 10,801 






Panel C. Price Dispersion Statistics By Time to Maturity 
  All Funds’ Prices  Bid Markers’ Prices  Mid Markers’ Prices 
Time  to  Maturity  Dispersion Obs. Dispersion Obs. Dispersion Obs. 
≤2  years  0.192  42,766 0.140*** 17,428 0.158*** 13,059 
(2,  5]  0.369  71,938 0.254*** 34,250 0.277*** 30,055 
(5,10]  0.472  100,788  0.321*** 51,840 0.334*** 51,534 
>10  years  0.546  36,913 0.323*** 14,333 0.393*** 11,627 
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Table 7 
Return smoothing and fund characteristics 
 
This table presents results from a logit regression that relates the tendency for funds to mark above the Bloomberg bond mid quotes to fund 
characteristics. The analysis is done at the position level with each bond in each mutual fund portfolio at a given report data representing a distinct 
unit of observation.  The dependent variable is an indicator variable that equals one for each bond position that is marked at or above the mid 
quote price reported by Bloomberg and zero for each bond position marked at or below the bid quote reported by Bloomberg.  The main set of 
independent variables include: Mid, an indicator variable that equals one if a fund uses a mid pricing standard, Ambiguous, an indicator variable 
that equals one if a fund has an ambiguous pricing standard; Negative Return, an indicator variable that equals one if the fund’s past 12 month 
benchmarked return is in the lowest negative return tercile; and Positive Return, an indicator variable that equals one of the fund’s past 12 month 
benchmarked return is in the highest positive return tercile.  To construct the Negative Return and Positive Return indicator variables, each month 
we first benchmark the past 12 month returns of each fund against either the Lehman Corporate Index or the Lehman High Yield Index, depending 
on whether the fund invests primarily in investment grade or high yield bonds.  Next, for each fund, we group all the negative and positive 
benchmarked returns separately and rank them within each group into terciles.  A return is defined as Extreme Negative if the benchmarked past 
12 month return as of that particular month is in the bottom tercile of all negative returns.  Similarly, we define a return as Extreme Positive if the 
benchmarked past 12 month return as of that particular month is in the top tercile of all positive returns.  Additional independent variables include 
Cluster Divergent, Family Disagreement, Not Big Four Auditor, Calendar, and Fiscal.  To construct the Cluster Divergent variable, for each fund 
and each period we calculate the fraction of bonds in its portfolio that are marked differently from the two most popular prices reported by all 
funds (cluster divergent fraction).  Next, we average the cluster divergent fraction across all report dates of a particular fund to compute a single 
metric per fund. We rank all funds based on their average cluster divergent fraction into terciles and for funds in the top tercile cluster divergent is 
set equal to one and zero for the other funds.  To construct the Family Disagreement variable, for each fund and each period we calculate the 
fraction of bonds in its portfolio that are marked differently from at least another fund belonging to the same mutual fund family (disagreement 
fraction).  Next, we average the disagreement fraction across all report dates of a particular fund to compute a single metric per fund.  We rank all 
funds based on their average disagreement fraction into terciles. Family Disagreement is set equal to one for funds in the top tercile and zero for 
the other funds.  Not Big 4 Auditor is an indicator variable that equals one if the underlying fund is not audited by one of the big four auditors. 
Calendar is a dummy variable that equals one if the bond position is reported at the end of December and Fiscal is an indicator variable that 
equals one if the bond position is reported at the end of a month that corresponds with the fund’s fiscal year-end.  The marginal probabilities for 
the independent variables are reported along with the associated t-statistics.  Standard errors are clustered by fund family and period.   40
 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
  Coef.  t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef.  t-stat 
Mid  0.167  (5.40) 0.167  (5.38) 0.167  (5.40) 0.171  (5.43) 0.170  (5.43) 0.168  (5.42) 
Ambiguous  0.070  (2.80) 0.069  (2.76) 0.077  (3.22) 0.061  (2.27) 0.072  (3.03) 0.070  (2.81) 
Negative  Return  0.036  (2.21) 0.032  (1.84) 0.043  (2.23) 0.036  (2.25) 0.040 (2.42)  0.036 (2.21) 
Positive Return  -0.037  (2.70)  -0.039 (-2.65)  -0.030 (-2.25)  -0.041 (-2.73) -0.035  (-2.25) -0.037  (-2.68) 
Calendar      0.038  (1.16)          
Calendar  ×  Negative  Return      0.025  (0.56)          
Calendar  ×  Positive  Return      0.032  (0.85)          
Fiscal      -0.016  (-1.17)          
Fiscal  ×  Negative  Return      0.008  (0.46)          
Fiscal  ×  Positive  Returns      -0.020  (-0.70)          
Calendar  ×  Fiscal      -0.017  (-0.57)          
Ambiguous  ×  Negative  Return         -0.020  (-1.29)        
Ambiguous  ×  Positive  Return          -0.022  (-1.56)        
Cluster  Divergent            -0.028  (-0.94)      
Cluster Divergent × Negative Return              0.003  (0.16)         
Cluster Divergent × Positive Return              0.013  (1.27)         
Family  Disagreement              0.051  (1.84)    
Family  Disagreement  ×  Negative  Return              -0.013  (-0.79)    
Family Disagreement × Positive Return                  -0.006  (-0.37)     
Not  Big  4  Auditor                0.020  (0.61) 
Not Big 4 Auditor × Negative Return                      0.024  (0.91) 
Not Big 4 Auditor × Positive Return                      0.011  (0.46) 
Observations = 405,026 
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Table 8 
Return smoothing regressions: 
 
This table reports coefficient estimates from the returns smoothing model of Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004).  The specification for the 
regression model is  
t , j 2 - t j, 2 1 - t j, 1 t j, 0
0




,t j R and  t j, R  are the reported and economic returns of fund j during period t.  In Panel A, consensus bond prices (computed as the cross-
sectional median of all prices reported by mutual funds with ownership in a particular bond in a particular period) were used to compute economic 
returns.  In Panel B, bond prices from Bloomberg were used to compute economic returns.  Funds with ambiguous marking policies are funds that 
did not disclose their pricing standard in at least one of their prospectuses.  Funds with explicitly stated marking policies are funds that always 
disclosed their pricing standard in their prospectus filed with the SEC.  Funds are also classified by their tendency to mark positions differently 
from the most popular prices used by all funds.  To construct this classification, for each fund and each period we calculate the fraction of bonds in 
its portfolio that are marked differently from the two most popular prices reported by all funds (cluster divergent fraction).  Next, we average the 
cluster divergent fraction across all report dates of a particular fund to compute a single metric per fund.  We rank all funds based on their average 
cluster divergent fraction into terciles: funds classified as High Cluster Divergent funds are those in the top tercile and Low Cluster Divergent 
funds are those in the bottom tercile.  Funds were also classified by their tendency to mark positions in disagreement with other funds from the 
same family.  To construct this classification, for each fund and each period we calculate the fraction of bonds in its portfolio that are marked 
differently from at least one other fund belonging to the same mutual fund family (disagreement fraction). We rank all funds based on their 
average disagreement fraction into terciles.  Funds classified as High Family Disagreement funds are those in the top tercile and Low Family 
Disagreement funds are those in the bottom tercile.  In addition funds were classified based on whether they were audited by one of the big four 
auditors or not. All results are based on pooled regressions and standard errors are clustered by fund family and period. T-statistics are presented in 
parentheses. 
   42
 
Panel A. Economic Returns Computed Using Bloomberg Bond Prices
  





















Not Big 4 
 
Big 4 
Intercept   0.000  0.001  0.000   0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
   (1.21)  (1.69)  (0.96)   (0.98)  (1.02)  (0.76)  (1.37)  (0.77)  (1.22) 
θ0   0.925  0.850  0.964   0.952  0.938  0.924  0.912  0.952  0.924 
   (28.04)  (15.12)  (37.59)   (30.43)  (25.94)  (21.07)  (17.09)  (36.82)  (27.26) 
θ1   -0.021  -0.004  -0.031   -0.020  -0.022  0.002  -0.020  -0.006  -0.022 
   (-0.99)  (-0.11)  (-1.75)   (-0.99)  (-0.72)  (0.06)  (-0.88)  (-0.50)  (-0.98) 
θ2   0.002  0.021  -0.008   -0.016  0.004  -0.002  0.000  0.000  0.002 
   (0.10)  (0.74)  (-0.44)   (-0.79)  (0.15)  (-0.11)  (-0.02)  (-0.01)  (0.11) 
                     
p-value H0: θ0 = 1     (0.00)    (0.00)  (0.00)    (0.00)  (0.00)    (0.00)  (0.00)    (0.00)  (0.00) 
R
2   86.16%  80.17%  89.30%   88.66%  87.20%  87.30%  85.33%  89.12%  86.03% 
Observations(Funds)   7,567(266)   2,227(79)  5,430(187)   2,452(88)  2,439(89)   2,435(88)  2,568(97)   430(17)  7,227(249) 
 
Panel B. Economic Returns Computed Using Consensus Bond Prices
  





















Not Big 4 
 
Big 4 
Intercept   0.000  0.000  0.000   0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
    (1.97)  (2.01)  (1.54)   (1.83)  (1.03)  (1.21)  (2.03)   (-0.12)  (2.10) 
θ0   0.962  0.931  0.974   0.966  0.987  0.957  0.946  0.985  0.960 
   (87.34)    (28.16)  (148.14)    (93.43)  (128.52)    (52.16)  (39.64)    (163.58)  (82.23) 
θ1   0.014  0.018  0.013   0.017  0.008  0.022  0.013  0.018  0.014 
    (3.50)  (1.77)  (4.12)   (4.61)  (1.48)  (2.59)  (2.18)  (1.66)  (3.29) 
θ2   -0.002   0.006  -0.005   -0.005  -0.005  -0.003  0.002  0.001  -0.002 
    (-0.46)   (0.79)  (-1.76)   (-1.22)  (-1.91)  (-0.72)  (0.29)  (0.26)  (-0.48) 
                     
p-value H0: θ0 = 1     (0.00)    (0.00)  (0.00)    (0.00)  (0.00)    (0.00)  (0.00)    (0.00)  (0.00) 
R
2   97.21%  94.94%  98.17%   97.68%  98.99%  97.09%  95.95%  98.54%  97.13% 




This table reports coefficients from regressions of fund θ0 on dummy variables used to classify funds and liquidity-
related control variables.  The estimation of θ0 was done separately using Bloomberg prices in Panel A and 
consensus prices in Panel B.  Ambiguous Marker is a dummy variable that takes a value of one for all funds with 
ambiguous marking policies, i.e., funds that did not disclose their pricing standard in at least one of their 
prospectuses. To construct the Cluster Divergent variable, for each fund and each period we calculate the fraction of 
bonds in its portfolio that are marked differently from the two most popular prices reported by all funds (cluster 
divergent fraction).  Next, we average the cluster divergent fraction across all report dates of a particular fund to 
compute a single metric per fund.  We rank all funds based on their average cluster divergent fraction into terciles; 
Cluster Divergent is set equal to one for funds in the top tercile and zero for the other funds.  To construct the 
Family Disagreement variable, for each fund and each period we calculate the fraction of bonds in its portfolio that 
are marked differently from at least another fund belonging to the same mutual fund family (disagreement fraction).  
Next, we average the disagreement fraction across all report dates of a particular fund to compute a single metric per 
fund.  We rank all funds based on their average disagreement fraction into terciles; Family Disagreement is set equal 
to one for funds in the top tercile and zero for the other funds.  Not Big 4 Auditor is an indicator variable that equals 
one if the underlying fund is not audited by one of the big four auditors. Price Range is a continuous variable that 
equals the value-weighted average price range of the underlying bonds in a fund’s portfolio.  The additional bond 
liquidity control variables are based on the underlying bond characteristics and these fund characteristics are 
averaged across all observations belonging to a particular fund:  Non-Investment Grade represents the weight of 
non-investment grade bonds in a fund portfolio; Issue Size is the weighted average issue size of all bonds in a fund 
portfolio; and Maturity is the value-weighted average time to maturity of bonds in the portfolio.  Other bond 
liquidity control variables are based on the underlying bond trade characteristics reported in the TRACE database: 
Trades is the weighted average number of trades for all the bonds in a portfolio reported in TRACE in the last month 
prior to the fund holdings report date and Last Trade Distance is the distance in days from the last trade for each 
particular bond averaged (value-weighted) across all the bonds in the portfolio. Standard errors are clustered by fund 
family.  T-statistics are in parentheses. 
 
Panel A. Economic Returns Computed Using Bloomberg Prices 
Variable   1  2  3  4 
Intercept   0.972  0.970  0.989  0.864 
   (65.32)  (67.21)   (4.44)    (8.65) 
Ambiguous Marker   -0.062  -0.050  -0.060  -0.046 
    (-2.67)  (-2.29)  (-2.51)  (-2.26) 
Cluster Divergent   -0.015  -0.012  -0.016  -0.006 
   (-0.81)  (-0.63)  (-0.86)  (-0.28) 
Family Disagreement   -0.007  -0.001  -0.004  -0.005 
   (-0.31)  (-0.03)  (-0.20)  (-0.26) 
Not Big 4 Auditor    -0.015  -0.020   -0.017   -0.017 
   (-0.63)  (-1.00)  (-0.70)  (-0.68) 
Log(Price Range)       -0.086      
      (-2.86)      
Non-Investment  Grade       -0.021    
        (-0.54)    
Log(Issue  Size)       0.003    
        (0.10)    
Log(Maturity)       -0.013    
        (-0.51)    
Log(Trades)         0.020 
          (1.15) 
Log(Last Trade Distance)               0.005 
          (0.26) 
          
R
2   4.09%  9.02%  4.58%  3.44% 
 Funds (Obs.)    266  266  266  252   44
Table 9-Continued 
 
Panel B. Economic Returns Computed Using Consensus Prices 
Variable   1  2  3  4 
Intercept   0.992  0.991  0.989  0.990 
   (172.36)  (172.97)   (7.33)    (15.20) 
Ambiguous Marker   -0.031  -0.024  -0.032  -0.029 
    (-1.89)  (-1.82)  (-1.96)  (-2.07) 
Outmode   -0.014  -0.012  -0.015  -0.010 
   (-1.50)  (-1.25)  (-1.54)  (-1.02) 
Family Disagreement   -0.006  -0.002  -0.009  0.000 
   (-0.31)  (-0.10)     (-0.51)  (0.01) 
Not Big 4 Auditor    0.005  0.002   0.007   0.002 
   (0.57)  (0.17)  (0.71)  (0.17) 
Log(Price Range)       -0.050      
      (-2.05)      
Non-Investment  Grade       0.010    
        (0.43)    
Log(Issue  Size)       -0.009    
        (-0.47)    
Log(Maturity)       0.027    
        (1.13)    
Log(Trades)         0.002 
          (0.13) 
Log(Last Trade Distance)               -0.003 
          (-0.25) 
          
R
2   2.46%  6.44%  3.87%  2.43% 
 Funds (Obs.)    266  266  266  252 
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Figure 1 
Time Series of Dispersion for the Four TRACE Bond Waves 
 
Figure 1 shows the time series of the average dispersion for the four Trace bond waves.  The first wave of bonds 
reported through TRACE encompassed all investment grade bonds greater than $1 billion in original issue size.  On 
July 1, 2002 FINRA required dissemination of transaction information for bonds meeting these criteria.  Second-
wave bonds include all investment grade bonds rated A or higher with original issue size of at least $100 million.  
These bonds became permanently disseminated as of March 1, 2003.  Third-wave bonds comprise all issues rated 
BBB- to BBB+ with an original issue size less than $1 billion.  The third-wave rolled out in two phases.  The initial 
phase began on April 14, 2003 when FINRA required dissemination for a subset of 120 third-wave bonds.  The 
secondary phase began on September 30, 2004 when all other bonds meeting third-wave criteria became 
permanently disseminated.  TRACE’s fourth wave, the rollout for high-yield bonds, also occurred in two parts.  
FINRA began requiring dissemination of a special subset of 50 highlighted high-yield bonds on July 1, 2002.  The 
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Appendix A 
 
Additional Institutional Bond Pricing Details 
 
Bond dealer firms and securities pricing services compile daily marks on 
individual issues.  Dealers compile these marks for internal profit and loss determination, 
repurchase agreement transaction collateral valuation, bond index construction and client 
servicing purposes.  Within each dealer firm, the trading desk responsible for dealing in a 
given security generally sets the end-of-day marks on that security.  Traders use available 
quotes from inter-dealer broker screens on the subject security or related securities, their 
own customer flows and any available “market color” – stories behind the day’s 
transactions relayed from a variety of sources – as inputs to the marking process. 
Furthermore, compliance and risk management professionals within the dealer firm 
typically review the appropriateness of these marks, especially with regard to the 
integrity of internal daily profit and loss figures.
22  Dealers provide a great deal of 
information concerning prices, relative value and insights to institutional buy-side 
customers.  Generally, there is effective best-in-class price knowledge for buy-side 
customers that have multiple (e.g., five) dealer relationships and access to price quotes 
from dealer sources.
23 
As it happens, the over-the-counter dealer market arrangement of bond markets 
and general reliance on dealer and/or pricing service marks for individual securities make 
bond funds generally less susceptible to stale pricing problems that are related to overall 
market volatility.  In particular, bond dealers and bond pricing services will mark 
individual securities on an option-adjusted yield spread (“OAS”) basis against the 
heavily-traded US Treasury benchmark issues.  In this manner, the entire set of bond 
universe marks will reflect the latest available general market moves through Treasury 
benchmarks.  But because so many corporate bond issues are illiquid and infrequently 
traded, there tends to be substantial variation in valuations nonetheless.  For example, 
different dealers will experience different customer flows and therefore may form 
different opinions about the underlying value of any infrequently traded issue.  The 
                                                 
22 See Pulliam (2007). 
23 See “An analysis and description of pricing and information sources in the securitized and structured finance 
markets,” The Bond Market Association and The American Securitization Forum, October 2006.   49
information a bond dealer collects through seeing specific customer trading flow goes 
beyond the trade’s price.  The size of the trade, the identity of the customer, and any 
explanations from the customer about the reasons behind the trade all matter.  Thus, a 
dealer who has not traded a particular illiquid bond for an extended period will have a 
less informative opinion on its current value than one who has recently traded it. 
Zitzewitz (2003) finds some evidence of NAV predictability in high-yield bond 
funds. Such evidence is at least partially consistent with the view that some price 
staleness may still be a problem for bond funds.  Nevertheless, grossly inefficient 
extrapolative valuation rules should not survive competitive pressures within the pricing 
services industry.  Indeed, such pricing services should seek to distinguish themselves by 
doing a good job of hand-pricing infrequently traded “hard-to-mark” securities.  Thus, 
given the incentives in place, we would expect that pricing services would generate 
unbiased valuations of even the hardest-to-mark securities. 
Variation among the valuations produced by different pricing services for the 
same corporate bond can be attributed to a number of factors.  Some of these factors 
relate to the underlying valuation analytics.  Important differences may exist in the 
specific inputs and models used by price providers for individual corporate bonds. 
Pricing services seek to differentiate themselves in the eyes of subscribing funds through 
offering “best-in-class” methodologies.  But other factors driving variation in bond 
valuations will relate to choices made by the funds themselves. Specifically, pricing 
services may provide a menu of marking alternatives that permit any subscribing fund to 
choose either 3:00 PM or 4:00 PM benchmark Treasury yield curves as the “closing” 
benchmark curve.  Furthermore, some pricing services offer funds the choice of marking 
the positions either at “bid” prices or at “mid” prices.  We provide insights into the 
importance of this “bid” versus “mid” choice in section 5. 
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